Dan Berbecel

• Despite the formal constitutional separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches in virtually all nominally democratic states throughout the world, some of these countries have experienced the phenomenon of hyperpresidentialism, where the executive branch has in practice been able to usurp power from the legislative and judicial branches. Presidents in these countries have often been able to govern through decrees, or even if they decided to go through congress, legislatures have often done little to try to seriously challenge presidential proposals. Fundamentally, my dissertation seeks to answer the question of why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not others. I will attribute the root causes of hyperpresidentialism to three independent variables, which together I claim make it highly probable that a president will be able to concentrate power. First, I will claim that weak state institutions in a country helps to promote hyperpresidentialism, whereas strong institutions ensure that presidential power is kept in check. Second, I will claim that the larger the size of the president’s party in congress, the more likely it is that the president will be able to concentrate power. Finally, third, I will argue that a history of economic crises is likely to promote hyperpresidentialism. My analysis will focus on the cases of Argentina and Chile, two countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America which despite being similar on many variables, critically differ in the extent to which they demonstrate patterns of hyperpresidentialism. Whereas Argentine heads of state have largely been able to act with relatively few institutional checks on their power, Chilean presidents have been significantly more restrained by institutions of horizontal accountability. In addition to these two case studies, my analysis also utilizes two large-N datasets of a) all presidential systems throughout the world, and b) presidential democracies in the Western Hemisphere

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